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 Abstract 
The paper investigates the significance of external and internal transaction costs and risk in 
agriculture in the Tatarstan Republic. The analysis is conducted for independent farms and 
farms which are members of agroholdings. The result indicates that external transaction costs 
are more marked in independent farms than in agroholding members. However, average pric-
es do not differ among the organisational forms. With regard to internal transaction costs (or 
inefficiency) the result is the opposite. Inefficiency in agroholding members is considerably 
higher than in independent farms. However, the estimation suggests that this result is due to 
more intense risk management in agroholding members. Thus, members of a business group 
have a more intense use of inputs; however, these are rather allocated to reduce uncertainty of 
production than to increase production. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Several studies have revealed that Russia's agricultural sector is lagging behind the develop-
ment of other sectors of the economy (Voigt and Hockmann 2008). The reasons for this phe-
nomenon are intensively discussed among economists and politicians. In this paper we will 
contribute to this debate and analyse the significance of risk and of external and internal 
transaction costs as well as their influence on agricultural development and production 
growth. The analysis will be conducted for the Tatarstan Republic. Agriculture in this republic 
is subject to massive administrative support. Thus, it is interesting to identify how political 
intervention may have contributed to agricultural development in this region by reducing the 
obstacles to growth. 
External transaction costs result in allocative inefficiency and find their expression in the var-
iation of prices among agricultural enterprises. Thus, analysing the variation of prices among 
farms provides information about market access and the significance of market transaction 
costs. Internal transaction costs determine the degree to which producers are able to exploit 
production possibilities. Thus, technical inefficiency can be regarded as an indicator of inter-
nal transaction costs. Risk leads to a variation of agricultural production around the average. 
This component basically results from the variation of natural conditions, e. g. weather. These 
indicators will be investigated for different organisational forms in order to assess whether 
productivity differences among agricultural enterprises are determined by the choice of tech-
nology or basically by ownership and governance structures in agricultural enterprises. Thus 
we will also contribute to the question whether the occurrence of horizontally and vertically 
integrated structures (often called agroholdings or business groups) have had a positive effect 
on agricultural production.
1 Moreover, we will identify which kinds of obstacles are mainly 
reduced when a farm becomes a member of an agroholding.  
The central indicator in our analyses is revenue. In a first step we decompose its variation into 
the variation of its components. These are the variation of product prices, and the variation of 
production (technology, risk, inefficiency). While the variation of product prices can be di-
rectly taken from the data, the contribution of the further components has to be estimated us-
ing econometric techniques. In the second step, we therefore apply stochastic frontier analysis 
to determine how technology, risk and inefficiency affect agricultural production.  
The paper is organised in five chapters. The next chapter deals with the decomposition of the 
variance of revenues into the contribution of prices and quantities. Differences in the level of 
                                                 
1  On this issue see for instance Kolnesnikov (2009), Wandel (2010) and Hockmann et al. (2009) production (productivity) and prices will also be investigated. Chapter 3 discusses the theoret-
ical background used for the stochastic frontier analysis. The results are presented in Chapter 
4 where we discuss estimation results and the implication of the contribution of technology, 
risk and inefficiency to production. In Chapter 5, the findings from Chap. 2 and 4 are put to-
gether resulting in a coherent picture of the impact of market access, technology, risk and in-
efficiency.  
2  REVENEUES AND QUANTITIY AND PRICE VARIATION 
2.1  Data  
We use accountancy data of agricultural enterprises in the Tatarstan Republic for the period of 
2006-2008 (Rosstat data provided by VIAPI). The original data set contains more than 1000 
observations. First, we excluded farms for which we had only one observation. Including the-
se would have led to large changes in the data set in the individual years, and the entering and 
exiting of farms would have biased the results significantly. Second, we excluded observa-
tions with nonsense partial productivities, e. g. when land productivity or milk production per 
cows was 100 time larger than average. This cleaning resulted in a data set of 277 farms and 
636 observations. The set contains 41 members of agroholdings; they account for 101 obser-
vations. 
The data set contains detailed information on production structures, specialisation and factor 
input. Moreover, implicit firm specific product prices can be calculated from the data set us-
ing the quantities and sales of marketed products. In addition, the data provide information on 
organisational forms and thus governance structures.  
In a first step, we took a closer look at production and product prices of the agricultural enter-
prises. Our data set allows conducting comparable analyses for grain, sugar beet, potatoes and 
milk. In order to assure that the comparisons are not biased by farm size, gross production is 
divided by an input unit. This unit represents the area planted with the corresponding crop and 
the number of cows in milk production. We first reveal information about different price and 
partial productivity structures of agroholding members and independent farms. In addition, we 
decompose the variance of output specific revenues in order to identify whether revenues by 
organisational form are differently affected by quantity and price variation. This analysis pro-
vides a first indication about the significance of external transaction cost in both organisation-
al forms, and whether agroholding members are better positioned to avoid these costs. 
2.2  Prices and partial productivities 
Table 1 provides information about partial productivities and prices received by farmers. The 
data show that marked price differences between organisational structures are observable. 
Basically, the same holds true for quantities. However, there is indication of higher yields per 
hectare for products where there is special activity of business groups (sugar beet). The results 
are quite astonishing. Often it is argued that prices received by agroholdings are only transfer 
prices and independent of market prices. The information in Table 1 provides no support of 
this view, since both groups receive, on average, the same prices. This precludes that agro-
holdings conduct special price strategies and the result presented in Table 1 is incidental only. 
This could be investigated further by comparing prices between agroholdings, however, these 
information was not available in our data. Although not as informative as holding specific 
prices, price variation between independent farms and group members may help to shed some 
light on this issue. Table 1:  Expected prices and quantities (per hectare) 
 Independent  farms 
  2006 2007 2008 
 E(y)  E(p)  E(y)  E(p) E(y) E(p) 
Grain 25.3  0.26  25.7  0.38  33.7  0.44 
Sugar 
beet  175.7 0.09  166.7  0.10  170.1  0.11 
Potatoes 111.1  0.33  117.6  0.41  137.3  0.54 
Milk 35.9  0.58 37.9  0.70 41.7  0.89 
 Holding  members 
  2006 2007 2008 
 E(y)  E(p)  E(y)  E(p) E(y) E(p) 
Grain 23.8  0.27  23.2  0.38  26.7  0.42 
Sugar 
beet  226.8 0.10  175.4  0.09  240.2  0.09 
Potatoes 73.6  0.27  118.8  0.33  143.8  0.47 
Milk 33.5  0.59 34.2  0.72 35.2  0.83 
Notes:  E(y) and E(p) denote the mean of production and prices, respectively.  
  Quantities are per input unit, e.g. crop production per hectare and milk production per cow. 
  Quantities are in 100kg and prices in 1000 Rouble per kg 
Source: Own  calculations. 
Table 2 shows that the coefficients of variation (CV) of prices differ considerably among the 
two groups of farms. Generally, the indicator is smaller for members of a business group than 
for independent farms. Thus prices received by agroholding members are more homogeneous 
than the prices independent farms are facing. This suggests that agroholding members might 
be less flexible in using different marketing channels. Together with the results from Table 1, 
the higher homogeneity of prices indicates that members of a business group are obliged to 
largely use the channel offered by the holding, however, they are paid a price oriented to-
wards the average price paid in the regions. This strategy can be assumed to lead to a reduc-
tion of transaction costs resulting from the use of the product market. On the other hand, the 
higher CV of prices given for independent farms imply that market transaction costs consti-
tute a serious problem for this group. In addition, given the differences in the CV for various 
prices, market transaction cost may differ among the product markets. 
Table 2:  Coefficients of variation of prices and quantities by organisational form 
 Independent  farms 
  2006 2007 2008 
  CV(y) CV(p) CV(y) CV(p) CV(y) CV(p) 
Grain  35.6 %  9.3 %  36.1 %  7.8 %  28.6 %  9.2 % 
Sugar Beet  28.1 %  17.5 %  29.7 %  8.7 %  28.5 %  4.0 % 
Potatoes  37.1 %  10.5 %  39.3 %  9.5 %  34.6 %  9.9 % 
Milk  33.4 %  6.7 %  31.3 %  8.3 %  27.9 %  5.7 % 
 Holding  members 
  2006 2007 2008 
  CV(y) CV(p) CV(y) CV(p) CV(y) CV(p) 
Grain  36.8 %  14.7 %  35.4 %  0.9 %  28.8 %  8.2 % 
Sugar Beet  15.4 %  4.4 %  47.7 %  0.0 %  6.0 %  3.1 % 
Potatoes  32.8 %  16.2 %  23.6 %  0.0 %  27.6 %  2.0 % 
Milk  28.0 %  6.2 %  32.4 %  0.6 %  25.8 %  6.9 % 
Notes:  CV(y) and CV(p) denote the coefficient of variation of production and prices, respectively.  
  Quantities are per input unit, e.g. crop production per hectare and milk production per cow. 
Source: Own  calculations. However, the extent to which transaction cost affect revenues may be rather marginal because 
this effect may be dominated by the variation of quantities. This conclusion cannot be denied 
ex ante, since the coefficient of variation of quantities is much more marked than the CV for 
prices.  
2.3  Variance decomposition 
In the following we discuss the contribution of the variance of prices and quantities to the 
variance of revenues. For this, we decompose the variance of revenues into the contribution of 
prices and quantities using a first order Taylor approximation:  
(1)    ) , ( ) var( ) var( ) var(
2 2 p y c p Ey y Ep py    , 
where p and y represent output prices and quantities and c(y, p) contains the covariance struc-
tures between prices and quantities (See Appendix). 
Table 3 suggests that the covariances between prices and quantities are fairly irrelevant for 
explaining the variance of prices. Indeed, the price and quantity variance accounts on average 
for about more than 90 % of the variation of revenues. Moreover, the covariance effects are 
positive in most cases. This implies a positive correlation between quantities and prices. This 
result suggests that products are not just sold to prevailing market conditions but that farms to 
some extent are able to negotiate better prices in case they are providing higher quantities. 
This again indicates that market transaction costs are a relevant phenomenon on agricultural 
markets in Tatarstan 
2.  
The calculations provide that the by far dominant share results from quantity; price variance 
contributes only little to the variance of revenues. In addition there are marked differences 
between the significance of price variation between members of a business group and inde-
pendent farms. However, a uniform statement regarding the shares is not possible. For some 
products, the contribution of price variance in the group of independent farms is larger, for 
some products we observe the opposite.  
                                                 
2   Svetlov (2009) and Svetlov and Hockmann (2007) investigated the role of external transaction cost in agri-
culture in Moscow oblast. Using a different approach (DEA) they also found that this cost significantly af-
fects agricultural holdings. Table 3:  Contribution of price and quantity variance to revenue variance 
 Independent  farms 
 2006  2007  2008 


















Grain  97.7 %  6.4 %  93.6 %  94.5 %  4.5 %  95.5 %  99.8 %  9.5 %  90.5 % 
Sugar 
Beet   85.5 %  28.0 %  72.0 %  102.8 %  7.9 %  92.1 %  91.1 %  2.0 %  98.0 % 
Potatoes 122.1 %  7.5 %  92.5 %  100.3 %  5.6 %  94.4 %  134.8 %  7.6 %  92.4 % 
Milk  89.4 %  3.9 %  96.1 %  87.4 %  6.7 %  93.3 %  91.0 %  4.0 %  96.0 % 
 Holding  members 
 2006  2007  2008 


















Grain  82.7 %  13.8 %  86.2 %  80.5 %  8.4 %  91.6 %  81.3 %  7.5 %  92.5 % 
Sugar 
Beet  110.4 %  7.7 %  92.3 %  102.5 %  2.8 %  97.2 %  54.6 %  21.6 %  78.4 % 
Potatoes  79.8 %  19.7 %  80.3 %  150.7 %  7.4 %  92.6 %  109.7 %  0.5 %  99.5 % 
Milk  92.0 %  4.7 %  95.3 %  96.4 %  5.5 %  94.5 %  83.8 %  6.8 %  93.2 % 
Note:  Quantities are per input unit, e.g. crop production per hectare and milk production per cow  
Source: Own  calculations. 
The dominant role of product variation requires taking a more detailed look behind the 
sources of its variation. In principle, we distinguish between four effects: size, productivity, 
risk and technical efficiency. Our main intention is to identify the contribution of risk and 
technical inefficiency (as an indicator of internal transaction cost) to output variance. The next 
two sections deal with this problem. First, we introduce the theoretical background. Following 
that we will present the results. 
3  THE SOURCES OF QUANTITY VARIATION: THEORY 
3.1  Methodological considerations 
In the analysis of the production structures we apply an extended version of the conventional 
production function, e. g. the risk production function. Compared to the conventional proce-
dure this model is able to consistently indentify the impact of individual inputs on risk and 
efficiency separately. This concept was originally introduced by Just and Pope (1978) and 
extended by Kumbhakar (2002):
3 
(2)  u q v g f y ) ( ) ( ) ( x x x    , with  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ N v  and  ) , 0 ( ~ u N u 
 . 
  f(x)  mean production function 
  g(x) risk  function 
  q(x) inefficiency  function 
Thus we decompose the variation in production into three components. First there is technol-
ogy or the mean production function f, which represents the average impacts of inputs (x) on 
production. The second component g is assumed to capture the effects of risk on production. 
Due to poor or favourable weather conditions actual output can be lower or higher than its 
average level. Thus, it is straightforward to connect the risk function with a two-sided error 
                                                 
3   In the following, bold symbols indicate vectors or matrices; all other variables are scalars. Subscripts will be 
omitted in order to improve readability. component (v). The function q captures the impact of factor use on the exploitation of the 
production possibilities or the efficiency of production. This function transforms the one-
sided error term u. 
For the empirical analysis we make the following assumption about the functional forms. The 
natural logarithm of the production function is a translog production function.  
(2a)     x A x x a a x ln ' ln
2
1
ln ' a 5 . ) ( ln 0          m t t m a t a a m a a f m t tm t t m  
In this representation we assume that the constant and the first order effects may change over 
time (t) and with organisational structure (m). The former is supposed to capture the impact of 
technical change, while the latter is introduced in order to test whether membership in an 
agroholding had a significant impact on the production structures. 
The risk function is assumed to consist of two parts. First there is generic risk. This compo-
nent captures the effects of overall weather condition and affects all farms similarly. In the 
empirical analysis we follow Bokusheva and Hockmann (2006) and consider this kind of risk 
by a constant and dummy variables for the years 2006 and 2008 (d06, d08). The second part of 
g is farm-specific or idiosyncratic and depends on the intensity and structure of input use. We 
assume that the idiosyncratic component can be represented by a Cobb Douglas functional 
form. Thus we have  
(2b)  m d d g m           x x ln ' ) ( ln 08 08 06 06 0  
For the inefficiency function h we also assume a Cobb Douglas functional form: 
(2c)  m q m    x θ x ln ' ) ( ln  
3.2  Estimation procedure 
The following considerations represent the workhorse of conventional stochastic frontier 
analysis: A production function f is given by  
(3)  * ) (    x f y , with  
   * * * u v    , ) , 0 ( ~ * v N v   and  ) , 0 ( ~ * u N u 
 . 
The error terms have the same properties as those in (2). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
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where  and  are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions. Optimal 
parameter estimates can be computed by maximizing the log likelihood associated with (4). 
Moreover, besides parameter estimates, estimates of expected efficiency can be obtained. Ac-
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The risk production function used in this paper is more flexible than the conventional produc-
tion function approach; however, it can be transformed to fit the requirements of the standard 
estimation procedure: (6)  u q v g f y ) ( ) ( ) ( x x x     
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The assumption v = 1 results from the introduction of the idiosyncratic component into the 
risk function. Without this assumption, the model could not be identified. 
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which implies the following log likelihood function: 
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4  THE SOURCES OF QUANTITY VARIATION: ESTIMATION RESULTS AND FURTHER INTER-
PREATIONS 
4.1  Data 
We applied the same data set which we had already used for the variance decomposition. In-
puts comprise land (Lan), labour (Lab), capital (Cap) and materials (Mat). The first and se-
cond are given by used agricultural area and the number of workers, respectively. Capital in-
put was approximated by depreciation. We constructed the variable by adding depreciation of 
capital use in crop and animal production, each deflated by the corresponding regional price 
indices for machinery. Materials comprise all expenses for variable inputs. The data base pro-
vided only information in current prices. Volumes were constructed by (a) weighting the indi-
vidual components (seed, fertilizer, feedstuff ...) by corresponding regional price indices and 
(b) adding up the individual volumes.  
Our output variable represents the volume of gross production. This variable was constructed 
in several steps. First, gross production in current price was estimated by adding the product 
of gross production in physical terms and firm specific product prices. We distinguish be-
tween nine categories of production. Crop production includes cereals, sugar beet, sunflower, 
potatoes and vegetables. Regarding animal production we distinguish between beef, pork, 
lamb, poultry, milk, meat, egg, wool and dairy production. Firm specific product prices were 
calculated from the data set through the relation of sales and the amount of marketed prod-
ucts. In a second step, we calculated firm specific multi-lateral consistent price indices using 
                                                 
4   J is the Jacobian. The Jacobian has to be applied because of the transformation from  to y (DeGroot 1989). 
In the standard workhorse the Jacobian can be omitted because the differential is equal to one. the approach developed by Caves et al. (1982).
5 In doing so, we used firm specific product 
prices and firm specific revenue shares. Finally, in the third step, we deflated gross production 
in current values by the firm specific output price indices.  
All variables were normalized by their geometric mean. Due to this procedure, the parameter 
estimates for the first order terms can be directly interpreted as the production elasticities at 
the sample mean. 
4.2  Estimation results 
Parameter estimates of the risk production function are given in Table 4. Most parameters in 
the mean production as well as the risk and inefficiency functions are highly significant. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the omission of the two latter would have produced biased estimates 
for the production function. 
The mean production function fulfils the monotonicity requirement (i, for i = A, L, C, V). 
An increase in input use results in an increase of production. This holds for independent farms 
as well was for the members of agroholdings. The mean production function does not exhibit 
quasi-concave requirements in all inputs. We found that materials and capital follow the "law" 
of diminishing returns (ii + i
2 - i < 0, for i = C, V) for independent farms, though land and 
labour showed increasing returns (ii + i
2 - i > 0, for i = A, L) at the sample mean. With-
out the consideration of risk these results could hardly be explained. However, the estimates 
indicate that the implementation of management techniques cannot be denied. These tech-
niques may be responsible for the unexpected results.  
Materials (V) are the most important input. The estimates suggest that about 49 % of reve-
nues are used for the remuneration of variable inputs. This result is consistent with the expec-
tation given the importance of purchased material inputs for modern agricultural production. 
The production elasticity of labour (L) is rather low and only significant at the 10 % level. 
Land and capital receive about 32 % and 18 %, respectively. Agroholding membership affects 
the production structures. However, estimates are significant for labour and materials only 
(AM, VM). The impact on land is positive, while its effect on material input is negative. 
Elasticity is defined as the relation of marginal and average productivities. Thus, the estimated 
values can be used to deduce more conclusions regarding differences of marginal productivi-
ties and factor use by organisational form. Since the normalisation average productivities at 
the sample mean are equal to one, the estimated values provide direct information about the 
marginal products. Thus, the low estimate of labour suggests that on average, independent 
farms might operate with a suboptimal and high labour input and thus are putting on average a 
relatively high weight to their social function in rural areas
6. Agroholding membership in-
creases the marginal product of labour significantly. Since the "law" of diminishing returns 
holds for agroholdings, this suggests labour input is considerably lower in agroholdings than 
in independent farms. This result supports the often heard proposition that agroholdings are 
more profit-oriented; they release underemployed labour, and thus are fulfilling the social 
function of farms less satisfactory than independent agricultural enterprises.  
The results also support the view that agroholdings have a better access to material inputs than 
independent farms. Marginal products in agroholdings are significantly lower than in inde-
pendent farms. Again, the law of diminishing returns implies that agroholding members apply 
material inputs more intensively than independent farms. Similar conclusions can be deduced 
for land and capital input, though the corresponding estimates are not significant. 
                                                 
5   Assuming a translog aggregator function, the result is a Törnquist-Theil Index. Basically, by this approach 
each observation is compared to the average in the sample.  
6  See Koester (2005) for more details on this issue.  Table 4:  Parameter estimates of the risk production function 


























Constant  o 0.0369 0.0255 1.4470 
Tim  T -0.0046 0.0138  -0.3309 
Tim*Tim  tT 0.0362 0.0374 0.9675 
Lab  A 0.0438 0.0272 1.6138 
Lan  L 0.3222 0.0313 10.3110 
Cap  C 0.1812 0.0157 11.5320 
Mat  M 0.4886 0.0268 18.2150 
Lab*Tim  AT 0.0410 0.0241 1.7048 
Lan*Tim  LT 0.0639 0.0288 2.2164 
Cap*Tim  CT -0.0263 0.0149  -1.7698 
Mat*Tim  VT -0.0450 0.0271  -1.6585 
Lab*Lab  AA 0.0713 0.0146 4.8701 
Lan*Lan  LL 0.2714 0.0758 3.5811 
Cap*Cap  CC 0.0755 0.0128 5.9138 
Mat*Mat  VV 0.2035 0.0557 3.6543 
Lan*Lab  AL 0.0787 0.0299 2.6367 
Lan*Cap  AC -0.0300 0.0116  -2.5796 
Lan*Mat  AM -0.0693 0.0242  -2.8669 
Lab*Cap  LC -0.0720 0.0303  -2.3741 
Lab*Mat  LV -0.1867 0.0487  -3.8343 
Cap*Mat  CV 0.0037 0.0194 0.1892 
Mem  M -0.2024 0.0530  -3.8169 
Tim*Mem  TM -0.0452 0.0421  -1.0752 
Lab*Mem  AM 0.1736 0.0401 4.3343 
Lan*Mem  LM -0.0096 0.0894  -0.1078 
Cap*Mem  CM -0.0456 0.0386  -1.1809 















Con  0 -1.6110 0.0657  -24.5220 
Dum06  06 0.0536 0.0795 0.6735 
Dum08  08 -0.0209 0.0897  -0.2331 
Lab  A 0.1977 0.0846 2.3383 
Lan  L -0.7574 0.0943  -8.0357 
Cap  C 0.2073 0.0653 3.1736 
Mat  V 0.9579 0.0744 12.8820 
























Lab  A 0.2043 0.1978 0.0335 
Lan  L 1.7257 0.2383 10.4220 
Cap  C -0.0150 0.1596  -1.3932 
Mat  V -0.3667 0.2068  -6.4048 
Mem  m -0.7275 0.5624  -1.7597 
Sig_U  u 0.1118 0.0254 4.4082 
Note:  t-ratios of 1.66, 2.04, and 2.72 are the critical values for the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels of 
significance, respectively.  
Source: Own  estimations. 
Average economies of scale are given by the sum of the production elasticities. The results 
show that independent farms as well as agroholdings operate at almost constant returns to 
scale. In addition, in the period under investigation we neither find a significant impact of 
neutral technical change (T and TT) nor a special impact of agroholding membership on technical change (TM). However, the estimates suggest that technical change was strongly 
biased (iT, i = A, L, C, M). It was labour and land using and capital and material input sav-
ing. 
All inputs except land had a risk increasing effect. In addition, the estimates were highly sig-
nificant. From the fact that inputs do not have the same sign it can be concluded that the farms 
apply some kind of risk management technique, however, the information we have does not 
allow to go into deeper detail. Agroholding membership appears to increase production risk. 
This result is consistent with the more intense use of purchased inputs in this organisational 
structure. In addition, the results with regard to the generic risk imply that the overall weather 
conditions in the years did not differ too much. 
Moreover, the estimate of the constant implies that generic risk is more important than generic 
inefficiency (u). The estimate of -1.611 implies a standard deviation of the two-sided error 
term of about 0.2.
7 This is almost two times higher than the standard deviation of the efficien-
cy distribution. According to our estimates efficiency is significantly affected by all inputs 
except capital. Labour and land input increase efficiency while materials tend to decrease ef-
ficiency. The effect regarding labour is consistent with the conclusion derived for the mean 
production function where differences in labour input were justified by the different percep-
tion of social function in independent farms and agroholding members.  
In addition, the results suggest that group members were better positioned than independent 
farms regarding the exploitation of production possibilities. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Hockmann et al. (2009) who pointed out that agroholdings usually change the 
managerial structure and adopt modern management structures that allow for better monitor-
ing of production processes. 
4.3  Variance decomposition 
In this section we discuss how the parameter estimates affect the contribution of production, 
risk and efficiency to the variance of inputs. First, an overview of the expected values and the 
relative importance of the variances of the three sources of variation are provided (Table 5). 
Agroholdings are considerably larger than independent farms as indicated by the expected 
values of mean production. Moreover, somewhat unexpected their inefficiency is also more 
marked. At the first glance, this contradicts the conclusion derived from Table 4. However, 
that table only considers the generic part of inefficiency. In Table 5, the idiosyncratic compo-
nent is included. Since inefficiency is considerably affected by the intensity of factor use and 
the impact of inefficiency, increasing inputs are higher than the coefficient of inefficiency 
reducing input, the level of inefficiency will increase with farm size. Thus, because agrohold-
ings are larger, their average level of inefficiency is larger as well. 
The coefficients of variation of mean production are quite similar among the two organisa-
tional forms. Thus, both groups can be similarly regarded as homogeneous (or heterogene-
ous). However, regarding inefficiency the spread among independent farms is larger than 
among agroholding members. Moreover, the coefficient of variation for inefficiency is more 
marked than for mean production. This suggests that inefficiency influences average total 
production stronger than differences in the structure of inputs. The highest coefficient of vari-
ation was computed for the risk component. On one hand, this result is a consequence of the 
definition of the two-sided error term, i. e. the fact that both organisational forms have a mean 
risk of about zero. On the other hand, the values indicate that production risk is an important 
feature of production that should not be neglected when analysing production structures. 
                                                 
7  The assumptions in (6) and the functional forms in (2) provide 
0   e v  .
 Table 5:  Statistical indicators for mean production, risk, and efficiency 
  Coefficient of variation  Expected value 
Independent farms 
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Mean  production  0.96 1.02 0.97 1.09 1.20 2.04 
Risk  29.50 -48.13  94.97 0.01  -0.00  0.00 
Inefficiency  1.60 2.48 2.14 0.11 0.12 0.23 
 Agroholding  members 
2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Mean  production  0.99 0.97 0.83 3.09 3.66 4.27 
Risk 199.58  -69.18  5.46  0.00  -0.01  0.21 
Inefficiency  1.51 1.35 1.15 0.31 0.32 0.35 
Source: Own estimations. 
Table 6:  Decomposition of the variance of total production 
 
Independent farms 
2006 2007 2008 
Share explained  128.9 %  134.8 %  153.4 % 
Mean production  83.3 %   116.1 %    133.7 %   
      Land productivity  32 %   23 %   18 %   
      Size (hectare)  79 %   73 %   108 %   
Risk  19.9 %  10.3 %  11.0 % 
Inefficiency  25.3 %  7.5 %  8.4 % 
 
Agroholding members 
2006 2007 2008 
Share explained  136.7 %  119.8 %  121.9 % 
Mean production  128.0 %  111.2 %  108.1 % 
      Land productivity  26 %   20 %   19 %   
      Size (hectare)  95 %   82 %   92 %   
Risk  5.5 %  6.9 %  12.3 % 
Inefficiency  3.1 %  1.6 %  1.4 % 
Note:  Mean production was decomposed using equation (1). The contributions are calculated in 
relation to the total variance of mean production. 
Source: Own  estimations. 
Table 6 contains our results regarding the variance decomposition of total production. As we 
did with the procedure for revenues, we concentrate on the variances only and ignore the co-
variance structures. The first lines for the organisational forms indicate how much of the vari-
ance of production is explained by the variance of the individual factors. First, in most years, 
considering variances only would overestimate the variance of total production. Furthermore, 
in most of the years the variance of mean production function is already larger than the vari-
ance of production. This implies that the covariances between mean production, risk and inef-
ficiency have a homogenizing effect on the variation of total production. Second, covariances 
appear to be much more important than in the decomposition of revenues. On average, they 
account for about 30 % of the production variance.  
Third, not surprisingly, the by far major part of production variance stems from mean produc-
tion. This result simply underlines the importance of farm size and the implied effects on spe-
cialisation and input intensities. The size effect accounts on average for more than 80 % of the variance of mean production. The differences in productivity play only a minor role and ex-
plain only about one fourth of the variance of mean production. However, the variation of 
partial productivities is far more important than the variation of risk and inefficiency.  
Compared to inefficiency, production risk is far more important for the variance of produc-
tion. Interestingly, the impact of risk in agroholdings is lower than the impact in independent 
farms. At first glance this is surprising since Table 4 reports that agroholding membership has 
a positive impact on risk (m). This was explained by the higher intensity of input use, in par-
ticular, purchased inputs. Table 6 implies that this intensity effect on risk was more than com-
pensated by employing risk management techniques. Their successful adoption leads to a con-
siderable reduction of uncertainty in production. However, it appears that this benefit was 
bought at the cost of higher input use which induces a lower level of efficiency (see Table 5). 
This effect also overcompensates the positive influence of agroholding membership effects on 
the generic impact of inefficiency which was discussed in the context of Table 4.  
5  CONCLUSION AND INTERPRETATION 
In this paper we analyse the significance of risk and external and internal transaction costs on 
agricultural development and production growth. The analysis is conducted for the Tatarstan 
Republic. We use accountancy data of agricultural enterprises for the period of 2006-2008. 
The data set contains 277 farms and 636 observations; 41 farms are members of agroholdings 
and account for 101 observations. 
First, we investigated production and product prices. Our data set allows conducting corre-
sponding analyses for grain, sugar beet, potatoes and milk. Marked differences between or-
ganisational structures are not observable, neither for prices nor for quantities. However, pric-
es received by agroholding members appear to be more homogeneous than the prices received 
by independent farms. This indicates that members of a business group are obliged to use the 
channels offered by the holding company, however, they are paid a price oriented towards the 
average price paid in the regions and benefit from a reduction of transaction cost. 
Second, the determinants of production variance were estimated using a risk production func-
tion with an inefficiency component. The parameter estimates confirm that all effects are 
highly important. Moreover, agroholding membership significantly affects the production 
structures. The results support the view that these companies have a better access to purchased 
inputs and use them more intensively than independent farms. Labour input is lower in hold-
ing members suggesting that this group pays less attention to the social function of farms in 
rural areas. In addition, both organisational forms seem to operate under constant returns to 
scale. Technical change was strongly biased, e. g. labour and land use as well as capital and 
material input saving. Neutral technical change was insignificant. 
All inputs except land had a risk increasing effect. The different signs for the inputs indicate 
that the farms apply some kind of risk management techniques in production. Consistent with 
the more intense use of inputs, agroholding membership appears to have a higher (generic) 
production risk. However, the idiosyncratic effects imply that agroholdings apply risk man-
agement techniques more intensively than independent farms. This results in a lower contribu-
tion of the risk component to total production variance. Moreover, this result confirms find-
ings from earlier studies which highlight the change in management and the adoption of mod-
ern management strategies observed for agroholdings.  
For inefficiency we found almost inverse results. Generic inefficiency in agroholdings is sig-
nificantly smaller than for independent farms. However, the idiosyncratic component changes 
the relation leading to higher inefficiency for group members. The estimation suggests that 
this result is due to more intense risk management in agroholding members. Thus, members of a business group use inputs more intensively; however, these are rather allocated to reduce 
uncertainty of production than to increase production. 
The estimates provide further that risk is of higher relevance for the variation of production 
than inefficiency. This found its expression not only in the generic but also in the idiosyncrat-
ic component. Moreover, for independent farms risk and inefficiency explain about the same 
amount of production variance than technology differences. Thus, risk and internal transaction 
costs appear to be much more important than external transaction cost. The latter conclusion 
is also relevant for holding members. However, it has to be emphasised that compared to in-
dependent farms these variances are on a relatively low level indicating that differences in 
technology are more pronounced in this group. 
In sum the results suggest that all three components, e. g. risk, external and internal transac-
tion, significantly affect agricultural production. Thus, for improving the conditions, agricul-
tural policy is required to tackle all the issues using a mix of appropriate policy measures. One 
option would be the support of holding membership. Our data show that this would reduce the 
costs associated with using the market mechanism and the costs resulting from volatile pro-
duction. However, these benefits come at the cost of higher inefficiency. However, the deter-
minants are not necessarily substitutes. A system of measures needs to be defined which im-
proves all indicators. In this sense, fostering membership in agroholdings can be only regard-
ed as a second best solution.  
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APPENDIX 
A first order Taylor approximation of a product (p y) around the means of the variables (p0,y0) 
is given by: 
    p y y y p p y p py 0 0 0 0       
Applying the definition of the variance provides: 
        
2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2
0 ) ( E ) ( E ) var( p y y y p p py y p py py py          
Expanding the bracket and putting the expectation operator through provides: 
      












E E ) ( E ) var(
y y p p y p
y y p p p y py y p py
 
      
. 
In this expression we already simplified by using    0 E 0   p p  and    0 E 0   y y . Applying 
the definition of the variance and covariance yields: 
              y p y p y p p y y p py , cov E E 2 var E var E , cov ) var(
2 2 2      . 
Putting the terms containing covariances into the function c(p,y) provides: 
    ) , ( ) var( ) var( ) var(
2 2 p y c p Ey y Ep py    . 